Parliament.' A document that one is bound to welcome for its general encouragement of palliative care (symptom control, effective communication and measures to support the quality of life for a dying person and their family) then goes on to claim that the patient also has a right to a medically assisted death. It claims that, 'by allowing him to fall asleep peacefully and finally, this medical and humane assistance (sometimes called euthanasia) is respect for human life'. It emphasizes that this would be at the request of a patient who can no longer tolerate an existence, 'Which has lost all dignity for him' but, at the same time, it makes a number of presuppositions that are not only most damaging to the public image of palliative care but also disregard problems of moral, civil and criminal law and above all of social pressure. Whatever our views on euthanasia, it surely cannot and should not be introduced as a logical part or extension of palliative care.
So far the situation world-wide is that in no country has a legal right been established for such a deliberately hastened death. However, in the Netherlands, although active euthanasia remains prohibited by statutory law, it is protected by both lower and supreme court decisions and is effectively tolerated legally. A set of guidelines have been established and it is emphasized that it should be the patient's voluntary decision after what is considered by them to be intolerable suffering. But, although it is expected that such action should be reported to the judicial authorities, it appears that this is frequently not done. A recent, state funded, nationwide study concerns not only euthanasia but also medical decisions concerning the end of life. It concludes that while such decisions are common (38% of all deaths) medical practice administering lethal drugs at a patient's request seems to have been done in only 1.8% of all deaths (in their study, 1900). However, they also report, 'Even so, in cases of euthanasia the physician often declares that the patient died a natural death.&dquo;-In a much smaller study, Gomez, 3 an American doctor, states that deaths by euthanasia in Holland have been estimated at anything between 2000 and 6000 a year or 5-15% of all deaths, with only a small percentage of this number reported as such. The problems of unconscious and incompetent patients are not covered by the existing Dutch guidelines and evidence cited by both GomeZ3 and Fenigsen4 4 shows that not only are the careful guidelines frequently disregarded but also that adequate palliative care is not always offered or available. This is hardly surprising for no country can claim that everyone in need is either offered or receives what is now theoretically possible. Gomez cites a series of case histories, examples put forward by the doctors concerned, which give rise to grave misgivings. Even the larger study quoted above has .not allayed this major concern. It, too, calls for more attention in research, teaching and public debate.
In the United States there is no such effectively legal acceptance of deliberate killing, although one or two much publicized cases seem to reveal a tendency in this direction. On the other hand, between the widely reported Quinlan and Cruzan cases a developing body of law has led to a set of practices of withholding or withdrawing treatment that is no longer considered to be in the patients' best interests. Sufficient evidence of a patient's previous views on this issue is required. Advance directives or Living Wills are therefore becoming more common or even mandatory on entering hospital.
The position in the UK depends much less on a developed body of law. So far there has been less danger of litigation and perhaps a greater readiness to accept a doctor's clinical judgement. Both are more likely to be considered or questioned in the future. Limiting treatment is common, although the public often does not appear to appreciate this and patients are not always well-informed before treatment is instituted. It may well be that a form of advance directive, preferably with a designated proxy to ensure some flexibility, should become more widespread. Such a document setting out a patient's wishes, but not including a request for medically assisted death, could well be of value and could be a means of elucidating an unconscious patient's wishes without the full force of law. Many years of experience in interpreting law concerning a person's need for care as a member of the UK Attendance Allowance Board has given me an awareness both of the difficulty of its interpretation in complex clinical situations and also gratitude that such decisions could be reviewed and changed and were not, as would be the case in euthanasia, irrevocable.
Appropriate or ethically indicated treatment
Appropriate treatment for a patient need not include every effort to prolong life regardless of its quality, but must recognize that what should be done for a patient with an acute remediable condition may be burdensome and is not necessarily indicated for someone with chronic or, still more often, a terminal condition. Each decision must consider, as far as can be ascertained, the patient's own wishes as to his best interests. Some make a distinction between a commission which is at present unlawful and an omission which may not be. Kennedy considers, however, that:
the real argument is not how a doctor's conduct can be characterised but whether in the circumstances he has fulfilled his duty to the patient in good faith. The principles of good faith reflect professional ethics and general social morality. Neither at present condones euthanasia, so that to cause a patient's death, whether by omission or commission, would be a breach of the duty to care for the patient in good faith and hence unlawful. Both, however, contemplate allowing the patient to die, if, in the circumstances, the illness is terminal and any other form of treatment, other than treatment for dying, would not be ethically indicated.'' 5
Alongside this we may set Devlin's summing up to the jury in the Bodkin Adams' case as presenting medical as well as legal principles:
If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health, can no longer be achieved, there is still much for a doctor to do, and he is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life. This is not because there is a special defence for medical men but because no act is murder which does not cause death.
We are not dealing here with the philosophical or technical cause, but with the commonsense cause. The cause of death is the illness or the injury, and the proper medical treatment that is administered and that has an incidental effect on determining the exact moment of death is not the cause of death in any sensible use of the term. But ... no doctor, nor any man, no more in the case of the dying than of the healthy, has the right deliberately to cut the thread of life.fi Ó Over the past two or three decades much progress has been made in palliative medicine and, as readers of this journal will know, a great deal has been accomplished in research to underpin and encourage the spread of more competent and understanding palliative care. This has been particularly marked in the treatment available for patients with far-advanced cancer. But the general approach and much that has been learnt because of this concentrated focus is increasingly shown to have relevance to other fields and has been learned from and shared with other specialities.
Patient requests
Those who work in palliative care have certainly heard requests for the ending of suffering and, having listened, have endeavoured to respond positively. The phrase, 'Let me die' often refers not to a request for a deliberate hastening of death but rather to a fear of treatment aimed at prolonging a burdensome existence. A careful explanation that what can now be offered will be aimed at improving the quality of the life remaining is commonly met with grateful understanding, although each change of treatment must be discussed as clearly as possible. Another wish sometimes expressed, 'I want to die' also needs to be patiently elucidated. It may be voiced because of poor past communication or because inept or even absent symptom control has failed to address the patient's real needs. For example, of a group of 124 patients with motor neurone disease referred for hospice care, only 15% were reported as requiring symptom control. Yet pain, insomnia and constipation, common symptoms occurring in an uncommon disease, were found on admission in no less than 70% of the patients and were relieved in a similar proportion .7 'Kill me', a definite request for medically assisted suicide, though heard more often than it was 30 years ago, is still extremely uncommon. It may be voiced because of long unrelieved pain and is likely to fade away once this has been addressed as in almost all cases it can be. More often, such a request seems to come from a hatred of dependence and helplessness and is more akin to the requests cited by those caring for other groups of patients, such as those with psychiatric or chronic pain problems, or indeed of the views of some still healthy people. We cannot take all this away but we can ease and share it. Many of us would agree with Foley in pointing out the relationship of pain and symptom management to such patient requests for physician-assisted suicide and how attitudes change when a positive attitude and effective relief are introduced. 'We need to address the access to expert care of distressing symptoms including pain and psychological distress before we can fully address the options for terminating life.&dquo;' The work of her team in New York and that of many others world-wide has shown the great progress made in the relief of pain during the past 20 years. 'Psychological distress' may call for expert help but certainly in our field it frequently responds to concerned and skilful listening. This is surely the experience of all the members of any multidisciplinary team involved in this work in whatever sphere it operates. Bereavement counsellors would join in pointing to the discovery of unexpected strengths and reconciliations that may emerge. We still have to work to eliminate those too often reported words, 'The doctor said: there is nothing more I can do'. Some symptoms and some experiences of hopelessness and helplessness will tax us all, but WHO publications not only point out how much suffering is currently unrelieved throughout the world but also how the proper use of ordinarily available drugs can be effective for the vast majority of those in distress. In Cancer pain relief and palliative care9 their expert committee adopted the position that, with the development of modern methods of palliative care, legislation of voluntary euthanasia is unnecessary.
In 1959 I wrote in opposing euthanasia, 'This is not to deny that patients do suffer in this country but to claim that the great majority need not do so. Those of us who think that euthanasia is wrong have the right to say so but also the responsibility to help to bring this relief of suffering about'. &dquo;' After more than 30 years of work, after facilitating and studying much research, watching the spread of hospice and palliative care nation and world-wide, studying much literature and, more importantly, after listening to hundreds of patients, their families, and many fellow professionals, that is still my position. I do not think any legalized 'right to die' can fail to become, for many vulnerable people, a 'duty to die' or at best the only option offered. Palliative and hospice care has its own impetus of care, research and teaching; to include it in part of a drive to make the deliberate shortening of life a legal possibility would be to take a radical change of direction, a denial of the importance of this part of life and I belicvc should be vigorously resisted.
Limiting treatment
But it is not only cancer that is feared, although the call for legalizing euthanasia which first came in the UK in the 1930s seems to have emphasized experiences of unrelieved terminal cancer pain. Gradually the pressure, at least during the past 30 years, has shifted more to fears of extreme old age, brain failure and helplessness. Patient choice and autonomy are put forward as the main reasons for a change in law. The degree of choice that exists already frequently appears not to be recognized. ' The prospect for most of us is a solitary death when a doctor decides to turn off a respirator'&dquo; may seem to the medical profession like a travesty of the truth but it is a real and common public fear in many countries including the UK. Decisions concerning limiting treatment certainly need to be made more frequently and truly informed discussions of realistic alternatives do not always take place, either with the patient and family or with the multidisciplinary team involved. In some countries, such as Australia, general principles may be discussed by a multiprofessional bio-ethics committee, and in others such committees may consider individual situations presenting dilemmas. It is surely time that all the professions recognized in practice that all their patients will eventually die and remember that the relief of suffering is as much their commitment as the search for and pursuit of a cure. So often this becomes increasingly illusory and may itself greatly add to suffering. Decisions of this kind are not easy and although medical isolation is gradually becoming less common, interprofessional discussions are not always given the prominence they deserve. Making life and death decisions alone is a great burden, nor should they be avoided by assumptions that everything possible to prolong life should be an almost automatic commitment.
Positive potentials and negative threats
The achievements for which palliative care has aimed have above all been the potential that patients still have in physical ease and activity, in personal relationships and in emotional and spiritual growth. Such treatment may itself not only add to quality but also to length of active life or even result in referral for more active intervention after all. 'The search for meaning' has frequently been put forward as a patient's important final aim and creative and individual discoveries have been seen by all of us. We are not at all concerned that a patient or family should come to think as we do but that they should find strength in their own inner values. All who have seen this happen during the time that would have been lost by the ending of life during an earlier despair would be concerned for the great difference, not in their professional satisfaction, but in the family's facing of a very different memory to carry through bereavement.
In fact many deaths today are most unlike such a version of the 'good death'. As we look at the pressures in hospital wards and nursing homes, the lack of community support for many in their own homes and the frequently indifferent or negative attitudes towards the increasing numbers of elderly people, we can certainly not be complacent. But surely this is the very climate in which euthanasia would not remain voluntary for long? Is there a society that will not exert pressure on the dependent to believe they are merely burdens with the responsibility to opt out or for exhausted carers to beg or to act for their joint release? Palliative medicine, with its increasingly experienced commitment to communication between professions and the patient, has learned much about enabling the latter's autonomy and self-respect. It has also learned, contrary to much modern belief, that an individual's autonomy has to be seen in the context of family and of society as a whole. There are people who press for a freedom to make a choice that would undermine the freedom of others from pressure should it be made legal. But in practice, we are not free to shout, 'Fire' in a crowded auditorium. Total individual independence was termed by Shaw as, 'Middle class blasphemy. We are all dependent on one another, every soul of us on earth'.'2 There is much more to offer the lonely, those in chronic or terminal suffering and those sinking into confusion and dependence than is sadly depicted in recent studies. 13,14 It has always seemed ironically apt that a society working for enabled or assisted suicide should be called Hemlock.
Surely Socrates drank the hemlock as an alternative to exile? We would not judge those desperate enough to take this step but some publications and pressures to change the law would bring in new and largely unpredictable dangers of abuse.
We still have further to go in giving patients truly informed control over what happens to them, in supporting them at homeso often the place of choicethrough better community services and in making effective palliative care available wherever they may be. If these are not offered by both statutory and voluntary services, more and more people will find their lives not worth living and it will be society's indifference rather than any lack of potential that their lives still have that will lead them to ask for a 'right to die'. To reach this point would, it seems to me, be a sad failure on the part of society.
The challenge to those working in any branch of palliative medicine is surely clear. Those working in the field have the responsibility not only for carrying out their practice but also for making it better known. We not only have to work continually on our own professional standards but also to spread the knowledge that already exists. We need also to emphasize to our colleagues and the public that there is an acceptable form of appropriate treatment that needs no laws for its establishment. On no account should it be designated as a form of euthanasia.
Cicely Saunders 
